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8. An analysis of Indonesia's transfer 
system: recent performance and future 
prospects 
Bambang Brodjonegoro and Jorge Martinez-
Vazquez 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-1970s, fiscal decentralization in Indonesia had been a slow-
burning affair. However, with the 'Big Bang' of the 1999 reforms, in the 
space of one year Indonesia changed from one of the most centralized to one 
of the most decentralized countries in the world. It was with significant 
trepidation that observers saw the share of sub-national government spending 
in total government spending almost double from 2000 to 2001, to over 30 
percent, and at the same time over two million civil servants and thousands of 
facilities were re-assigned to local level. However, the widespread concerns 
about chaos and disarray did not materialize. The transition to the new 
decentralized system had some bumps, but overall was fairly smooth. 
In hindsight, there are many reasons for this largely successful transition. 
There is little doubt that, despite some defects, the institutional framework 
for fiscal decentralization, laid out in Laws No. 22/1999 and No. 25/1999, 
deserves much credit for the success. The centerpiece for the new fiscal 
decentralization institutions in Indonesia is the new system of transfers com­
prising revenue sharing of natural resources, personal income tax, and property 
taxes, the DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum) a large unconditional grant intended to 
fund sub-national governments in an equalizing manner, and the DAK (Dana 
Alokasi Khusus), a set of yet to-be-developed conditional grants. 
In this chapter we examine the performance of this transfer system. We 
first discuss the history of transfers in Indonesia. We next review the structure 
and performance of the new system of transfers in Indonesia, and then focus 
on the unfinished agenda for reform. Our main conclusion is that, with the 
development and initiation of the DAU in 2001, the government of Indonesia 
(GOI) got the fundamental concepts right but also got many of the particular 
details wrong. The performance of the DAU was hindered by several choices 
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made in the implementation of the new system, the most important being an 
extremely rigid interpretation of the 'hold harmless' provision. The GOI 
proceeded to reform the DAU for 2002, and, although real improvements 
were made, some important issues still remain, including how the new sys­
tem should move away from the suffocating grip of the hold harmless provision. 
Also, the GOI faces important challenges but also good opportunities in 
shaping and increasing the importance of the DAK conditional grant system. 
With respect to revenue sharing on a derivation basis, we recommend that the 
GOI should not develop it further, but instead it should focus on developing 
the revenue autonomy of sub-national governments.1 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSFERS IN INDONESIA 
Transfer systems have a long history in Indonesia. From the time of inde­
pendence in 1945, Indonesia's experience with intergovernmental fiscal finance 
can be classified into three periods: a pre-SDO period, an SDO period and the 
current DAU period. 
The pre-SDO period extends from 1945 to 1972. During this time, there 
were many forms of intergovernmental transfers, often introduced to reduce 
tensions between central and local governments. Until 1956, the stated goal 
was to ensure local governments had the ability to finance their planned 
budget deficits through central government subsidies. Not surprisingly, cen­
tral government was not able to operate the system and largely had to avoid 
its original commitment. In 1956, the government issued Law No. 32/1956 
with a defined concept of intergovernmental fiscal transfers based on a for­
mula. This proved to be too advanced for the time and never got off the 
ground, but the Law was not canceled until 1999. 
From 1956 to 1964, the central government introduced a tax revenue 
sharing scheme in which local governments received some percentage of 
central government tax revenue. In 1965, the central government replaced the 
tax sharing system with direct subsidies that were based on the total wage bill 
of local governments. The scheme was called the 'intergovernmental subsidy 
system,' and it would become the basic concept later applied in the Subsidi 
Daerah Otonom (SDO), or Autonomous Region Subsidy. Over approximately 
the same period (1965-74), central government applied other types of inter­
governmental transfers, such as central government contributions to local 
governments, development assistance funds, natural resources revenue shar­
ing (in terms of royalties for forestry products), and land rent for mining 
activities. However, these other transfers often lacked an adequate legal basis. 
The SDO system was first fully implemented in 1972/73. The core concept 
behind the SDO was that central government would fully support the costs of 
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local government employees. Two-thirds of the SDO was allocated to provin­
cial governments, and the rest was for the district/municipality governments. 
The SDO is best classified as a specific purpose or conditional grant with no 
discretion at local government level. Aside from the SDO, local governments 
also received Instruksi Presiden, or INPRES transfers, which were earmarked 
for local development activities. An important objective of the INPRES system 
was to reduce regional disparities, and its allocation was based on several 
criteria such as population, local own revenue (PAD), a minimum transfer per 
local government, area, previous transfers, and so on. In reality, there were 
many types of INPRES grants. Some of them could be classified as specific 
purpose grants (e.g. INPRES for basic education, health services, reforesta­
tion, or small retailers). Others could be classified as general purpose or 
block grants (e.g. INPRES for provincial development, district/municipality 
development, or village development). General purpose (or block) INPRES 
grants generally had larger funding than specific purpose INPRES grants. 
Both SDO and INPRES were Indonesia's transfer system until the introduc­
tion of the DAU in 2001.2 
THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF TRANSFERS IN INDONESIA 
Law No. 25/1999 introduced three types of intergovernmental transfers: rev­
enue sharing, the DAU, or General Allocation Fund, and the DAK, or Specific 
Allocation Fund. We will consider each in turn. 
Revenue Sharing 
Three types of taxes are currently shared between the central and sub-na­
tional governments on a modified derivation basis. These are natural resource 
taxes, personal income tax, and property taxes (the property tax or PBB, and 
the land transfer fee or BPHTB). The most significant of the three is natural 
resources revenue sharing. This is a new type of revenue sharing, introduced 
by Law No. 25/1999 with the intention of compensating natural resource-rich 
regions that had felt unfairly exploited during the Soeharto era and that more 
recently had demonstrated their aspirations to controlling and benefiting from 
the natural resources in their territories. There are four natural resource 
commodities whose tax revenues are shared between central and local gov­
ernments: gas and oil, general mining, forestry and fishery. At the sub-national 
level of government, there is revenue sharing among the provincial govern­
ments, the producing district/municipal governments, and other district/ 
municipal governments within provinces. The revenue sharing rates for natu­
ral resource taxes are shown in Table 8.1. 
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Revenue sharing of natural resources has remained controversial since 
Law No. 25/1999 because several of the resource-rich regions still seemed to 
believe that they were not getting a fair share. One part of the problem has 
been the lack of transparency in the calculations of total revenues from 
natural resources, and another has been the sharing rates. 
In response to the tensions surrounding the sharing of natural resource 
revenues, central government approved in 2001 special regimes for the most 
politically assertive provinces, Aceh and Papua. These laws represented the 
first important instance in which central government legally accepted asym­
metric treatment of subnational governments.3 Aceh's Special Autonomy 
Law No. 18/2001 gives this province an additional 55 percent of petroleum 
taxes and 40 percent of gas taxes, compared to the standard 15 percent and 30 
percent, respectively. This means that the special autonomy scheme gives 
Aceh 70 percent of oil and gas revenue sharing. Papua's Special Autonomy 
Law No. 21/2001 applies a similar proportion.4 In both special autonomy 
laws, the whole additional revenue from petroleum and gas taxes will be 
received directly by their respective provincial governments and the provin­
cial governments will be responsible for allocating the fund to all of their 
kabupaten and municipalities using their own formula. 
Revenue sharing for personal income tax was first introduced with the 
1999 reforms. Property tax and land transfer fee revenues were already 
shared between central and local governments prior to the 1999 reform. 
Through the revision of income tax law (Law No. 17/2000), central govern­
ment added personal income tax (including payroll tax) to the tax sharing 
scheme, where 80 percent of personal income tax revenues are still retained 
by central government and the rest goes to provincial (8 percent) and district/ 
municipal governments (12 percent).5 Table 8.2 gives the sharing rates for 
other taxes. 
Revenue sharing on a derivation basis is helping with general funding of 
sub-national governments, and thus is being used as a way to address vertical 
imbalances in Indonesia. Revenue sharing is also being used to address the 
important political issue of redressing perceived past injustices toward natu­
ral resource-endowed regions. But revenue sharing can also be a source of 
problems, the most serious of which is increasing fiscal disparities; however, 
this is a problem that can be addressed through equalization transfers. It is 
notable that Indonesia has avoided so far the problems associated with rev­
enue sharing arising from the difficulty encountered with the fair apportionment 
of taxes such as VAT or corporate income tax. It was a wise decision not to 
share those taxes with sub-national governments, and it should be kept that 
way. 
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Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU), or the General Allocation Fund 
The DAU is by far the most important type of transfer in Indonesia, and 
finances approximately three-fourths of sub-national government expendi­
tures. The DAU can be classified as a general purpose grant that gives full 
discretion to local governments to spend the funds according to their priori­
ties. The DAU is a well-developed equalization grant system with explicit 
funding rules and formulas for the distribution of the funds. The overall pool 
of funds comes from 25 percent of net domestic revenues (or total domestic 
revenue minus revenue sharing) in the central government budget. From that 
amount, provinces receive 10 percent and district/municipal governments 90 
percent. Details of the formula used for the allocation of DAU in 2001 and 
2002 are shown in Appendix 8.1. The formula is practically identical for 
provinces and district/municipal governments. 
The basic concept behind the DAU formula is the fiscal gap, or the differ­
ence between measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity for each 
local government. The expenditure needs for each jurisdiction are approxi­
mated by applying a weighted index of four variables (population, area, cost 
differences, and poverty) to the average expenditure for all jurisdictions. The 
fiscal capacity of each jurisdiction is approximated by adding an estimate of 
its own revenues to the actual revenues from shared taxes. 
In fact, however, only 20 percent of the DAU overall funds were allocated 
through the formula in 2001; in 2002 this figure increased, but only to 40 
percent. The rest of the DAU funds were allocated to the provinces and 
districts/municipalities on the basis of two additional sets of factors. The first 
factor was a lump sum or equal amount that each jurisdiction (province and 
district/municipality) received during the fiscal year. The lump-sum factor 
represented 10 percent of the total DAU funds in 2002, as specified by 
Parliament.6 The lump-sum factor has been justified as covering fixed or 
overhead costs of the jurisdictions. However, it is feared that this has given an 
incentive for the further fragmentation of local governments. 
The second additional factor governing the final allocation of the DAU is 
the so-called 'balancing factor,' predicated on the basis of a 'hold harmless' 
condition. The balancing factor for 2001 was proposed by the Ministry of 
Finance and applied only to the districts and municipalities, and assured that 
every district/municipality received a minimum transfer equal to 130 percent 
of the SDO funds and 110 percent of the INPRES funds it got in 2000. This 
second factor took the bulk of the DAU funds in 2001. The interpretation of 
the hold harmless provision in 2002 was demanded by Parliament as meaning 
that no jurisdiction would get less than the funds it got in 2001. This meant 
that in addition to the 10 percent of the DAU going to the lump sum factor, an 
additional 50 percent of the DAU went to the balancing factor in 2002. The 
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funds of the balancing factor in 2002 were distributed among local govern­
ments in proportion to their relative wage bill for public employees.7 As will 
be discussed further, the balancing factor could have worked against the 
objective of equalization in the DAU,8 but also introduced in 2002 an incen­
tive for local governments to hire more employees and to spend more on 
salaries. 
Law No. 25/1999 emphasized the equalization role of the DAU, but in 
reality the DAU has served several objectives other than equalization. By 
virtue of the 'balancing factor,' all jurisdictions receive a DAU amount no 
matter how well off they are. This means that the DAU functions as a general 
funding mechanism to address vertical imbalances. The DAU is also being 
used as a way to redress historical injustices.9 
A recent government regulation requires that local governments report on 
the uses of the DAU on a quarterly basis. This regulation raises the question 
of whether the DAU will remain an unconditional grant in the future. We will 
discuss the possibility of transforming some of the funds now used for the 
balancing factor into conditional grants. However, the question with report­
ing requirements and even more so with any conditionality is whether the 
central authorities have the means to monitor and enforce them. 
Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK), or the Specific Allocation Fund 
Law No. 25/1999 introduces specific purpose, or conditional, grants for two 
types of objectives: to help fund important needs which cannot be incorpo­
rated in the DAU formula10 and to provide funding for activities which relate 
to national priorities or commitments.11 A third category contemplated as part 
of the DAK is a mechanism for intergovernmental sharing of forest exploita­
tion fees. 
The DAK is still a minor part of Indonesia's system of intergovernmental 
transfers. The DAK is seen in law as a conditional matching grant, and local 
governments receiving DAK funds are supposed to provide at least 10 per­
cent of the total amount of the project on their own.12 The source of funding 
for the DAK is the central government budget, except for reforestation activi­
ties, which are covered directly by fees from the reforestation fund.13 
Except for reforestation funds, the DAK system was not used in either 
2001 or 2002. Two questions arise. First, from where is the funding for the 
DAK to come? One answer commonly offered is that some of the develop­
ment expenditures now going through central government agencies could be 
transformed into conditional grants as part of the DAK (Hofman et al., 2002). 
Another possibility is to use some of the funds now used as the balancing 
factor in the DAU as funding for conditional grants in the DAK. This issue is 
not yet resolved. Second, on what basis should the DAK be allocated? The 
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approach for DAK allocation is vague in the Law, and this lack of transpar­
ency may eventually raise questions of arbitrariness. Several approaches are 
possible to bring transparency in the DAK. The funds may be distributed as 
part of national sectoral programs, which may include investments in capital 
infrastructure and could be distributed according to clear and objective crite­
ria summarized in explicit formulas. DAK funds may also be used as 
contingency funds for natural disasters. Regardless, rules should be estab­
lished for the annual allocation, the authority to disburse, and the final 
disposition. In general, DAK funds should be distributed to achieve central 
government goals such as stimulating regional spending on activities of na­
tional interest or addressing externalities across regional governments; 
redistribution need not be emphasized if the DAU does a sufficient job in 
equalizing fiscal disparities. In this regard, remember that during 2001 and 
2002 the DAU was severely constrained in its equalization role. If these 
constraints continue in the future, then it may be necessary to consider an 
equalization role for the DAK. 
Recent Changes in the DAU 
A remarkable feature of the new system of transfers in Indonesia has been an 
officially guided process of rigorous examination and improvement. This is 
good because the short time available to put together the DAU in 2000, from 
principles to the most concrete details of implementation, inevitably meant 
that the new transfer system would have problems. These problems were 
indeed numerous. However, the DAU also got may things right, and these 
were in general the very fundamental aspects of the transfer system (Martinez-
Vazquez, 2001). 
The accomplishments of the DAU in 2001 were in three areas. First, the 
government used a transparent rule for how to fund the DAU, and also clearly 
established the division of the overall pool of funds between the two tiers of 
regional governments, the districts/municipalities and the provinces; this fund­
ing rule was kept for the second year. Second, the formula used for the DAU 
looked at the difference between estimated expenditure needs and revenue 
capacity as opposed to actual expenditures and actual revenues of regional 
governments. This avoided moral hazard problems of providing incentives to 
regional governments to spend more and collect too little in an attempt to 
increase their DAU allocations. Third, the DAU used a phased-in approach, 
although the 'hold harmless' provision was carried too far. 
There were also in 2001 several questions and several problems with the 
DAU. There were questions about the adequacy of the DAU overall funding 
at 25 percent of central government domestic revenues, as well as questions 
about ways to improve on the variables used in the estimation of fiscal or 
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expenditure needs and the weights attached to them.14 Among other prob­
lems, the DAU formula lacked aggregate consistency because some of the 
variables in the definition of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs were not 
properly scaled. Another problem was that the computation of fiscal capacity 
applied an index of industry, natural resources, and human resources, equally 
weighted, both to 'local own revenues' and to 'shared revenues.' Instead, the 
index should have been applied only to 'local own revenues'; the other 
component, 'shared revenues', should have been entered in the formula di­
rectly as forecast by the government authorities. The reason for using an 
estimate for fiscal capacity is that there exists a moral hazard problem with 
using direct estimates of revenues. When direct estimates of revenues are 
used in the formula, local governments are given an incentive to collect less 
revenue by lowering tax enforcement and administration efforts, by lowering 
tax rates, or modifying the tax base (assuming they have discretion over any 
of those dimensions of actual revenue effort). In the case of Indonesia, local 
governments have some discretion over the level of tax effort they can exer­
cise for local own revenues. However, they have no discretion at all over 
shared revenues. This of course raises the question of whether local govern­
ments with a negative fiscal gap would receive zero funds from the DAU.15 
During the first few months of the implementation of the DAU in 2001, it 
became clear that the government would have to review an important issue 
related not to the structure of the DAU but rather to its implementation 
process. This was the 'hold harmless' provision. The analysis used to back up 
the quantification of the 'balancing factor' had been incomplete, and ulti­
mately led to erroneous policy because the budgetary position of local 
governments in 2001 was very different from their respective position in 
2000. There were big differences arising from major changes in expenditure 
assignments, as specified in Law No. 22/1999, and from changes in revenue 
assignments, including revenue sharing in natural resources. Therefore, pro­
viding regional governments with transfers at least equal to the SDO and 
INPRES funds they got in 2000 did not guarantee they were held harmless in 
the new fiscal environment of 2000. The 'hold harmless' provision should 
have been framed better by comparing the old plus new expenditure assign­
ments (where the latter should have been costed at the level of funding 
required in the last year before those responsibilities had been decentralized) 
against own regional government revenues plus new resources from revenue 
sharing plus new transfers from DAU and special allocation grants; the DAU 
and special allocation grants should have been at least as large as the SDO 
and INPRES transfers in 2000. However, it must be noted that even this 
would not have been sufficient to hold harmless local governments; that is, 
the DAU transfers in 2001 may have exceeded the SDO and INPRES trans­
fers in 2000, but the remainder may have been less than the funding required 
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for the new expenditure assignments net of revenue sharing. On the other 
hand, some regional governments may have received so much more funding 
through revenue sharing in 2001 that they would have been held harmless 
even without DAU transfers. In such cases, holding harmless would not have 
required the transfer of funds equivalent to SDO and INPRES received in 
2000, when there was no revenue sharing. 
Even though it was not possible to phase out the hold harmless provision in 
the 2002 DAU, the reformed DAU represents a marked improvement over the 
2001 DAU. The major improvement occurred on the revenue side. In 2002, 
all revenue components reflected capacity coming either from actual revenue 
sharing or from estimated local capacity. On the expenditure side, progress 
has been slower due to limited data availability. 
THE RATIONALES FOR TRANSFERS IN INDONESIA 
There are several reasons for intergovernmental transfers, both in general and 
in the specific case of Indonesia. This section considers these justifications. 
To Correct Vertical Imbalances 
One of the most important objectives of the intergovernmental transfer sys­
tem in Indonesia is to reduce vertical imbalances. The decentralization process 
has transferred significant expenditure responsibilities to sub-national gov­
ernments, which now require more reliable sources of financing. The questions, 
of course, are whether there is a vertical imbalance now in Indonesia, and, if 
so, how significant this imbalance is. 
There is no unique definition of vertical imbalances. Broadly speaking, a 
vertical imbalance arises when there is no correspondence between the ex­
penditure responsibilities and the revenue sources assigned to each level of 
government. Several approaches are used to measure the presence and impor­
tance of vertical imbalances. 
One approach is to identify the existence of persistent budget deficits at a 
particular level of government. Here, the size and persistence of the deficits is 
taken as prima facie evidence of such an imbalance. Independently of its 
accuracy, this diagnostic tool cannot be used for Indonesia because there is 
no information available on sub-national government deficits for recent years.16 
Another approach is to quantify expenditure needs or requirements at differ­
ent levels of government and then to compare them to available resources. One 
possible outcome here is that both central government and sub-national govern­
ments are short of funds, since there is inherent ambiguity associated with the 
expenditure levels (quantity and quality of services) that can be associated with 
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the assignment of expenditure responsibilities at each level of government. One 
way currently being debated in Indonesia of dealing with this ambiguity is to 
do an exhaustive listing of standards or norms for provision and to conduct an 
accounting of the expenditures required for explicitly stated and agreed upon 
levels and quality of public services. This approach is very costly and time 
consuming, and also requires a significant degree of intergovernmental consen­
sus and communication. Without these, the listing and costing of expenditure 
norms can lead to intergovernmental friction and poor budgeting practice.17 
A third approach to identifying vertical imbalances is to examine to what 
extent different levels of government are able to finance expenditures from 
their own sources of revenues. The attraction of this approach is that it by­
passes the uncertainty surrounding any measurement of government needs. A 
simple and effective guarantee against vertical imbalance is to provide each 
level of government with enough revenue autonomy so that they can make 
their own decisions regarding what services to cover and at what level. By 
this measure, there is considerable vertical imbalance against sub-national 
governments in Indonesia. 
Current local tax power only contributes a small proportion of the total tax 
revenue in Indonesia, and it is far from enough to finance most of the new 
expenditure responsibilities transferred to local governments. Table 8.3 shows 
that local own revenue (local taxes and charges) only contributed between 3-
4 percent during the two fiscal years, 2000 and 2001. Clearly, it will be 
impossible for local governments in Indonesia to finance their basic needs or 
basic expenditures if their sources are only local own revenues. 
Table 8.3 Central and local fiscal indicators, 1998-2001 (in percent) 
Local/total Local own/ Intergovernmental transfer/ 
Fiscal year expenditure total revenue total local expenditure 
1998/00 15.81 3.31 97.19 
1999/00 16.61 3.63 79.23 
2000 17.88 3.10 85.87 
2001* 24.82 3.80 103.04 
Notes: 
Total expenditure = National expenditures - Intergovernmental transfer + Total local expendi­
ture 
Total revenue = National revenue + Local own revenue 
Local revenue = Local own revenue + Intergovernmental transfer 
* Estimated data for 2001 using proposed budget. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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The current practice in Indonesia of measuring vertical imbalances has 
been to examine whether the 25 percent funding for the DAU, together with 
own revenues (PAD) and shared revenues, has been enough to finance old 
and new expenditure responsibilities. Often, even this practice reduces to 
examining whether the cost of personnel attached to a level of government 
can be covered by the overall funds made available to that level of govern­
ment. The most authoritative study of this question is by Lewis (2001), who 
concludes that, while provincial government may have been a bit short in 
2001, the districts/municipalities were amply funded. Clearly, the transfer 
system, especially the DAU, plays a key role in reducing the possible vertical 
fiscal imbalances between central and local governments. 
To Reduce Horizontal Imbalances 
Horizontal imbalances arise from existing fiscal disparities across sub-na­
tional jurisdictions. Sub-national governments generally have different tax 
capacities because they differ in their economic bases. In Indonesia there are 
significant disparities in gross regional product per capita (GDRP 1999 per 
capita). At district/municipality level (Table 8.4), the coefficient of variation 
in 1999 was 2.12, and the maximum value was 172 times higher than the 
minimum value. At provincial level, the corresponding values are lower, with 
a coefficient of variation of 0.93 and a gap between maximum and minimum 
of 16 times (Table 8.5). 
There are also significant disparities for actual revenues collected. For 
example, the coefficient of variation for districts/municipalities for own rev­
enues per capita in 1999 (Total collection per capita in Table 8.4) is 2.24 and 
for shared revenues in 2001 (Revenue share per capita in Table 8.4) is 2.91. 
The coefficients of variation for these two variables for the provinces are a bit 
lower but still quite high. 
Horizontal fiscal imbalances also may exist because of disparities across 
sub-national jurisdictions in expenditure needs. The differences in needs may 
arise from either different prices or costs of service provision or from differ­
ent shares of the population with special needs. Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show that 
there is little variation in price levels as measured by the construction price 
index (Const index). However, there are significant disparities in the inci­
dence of population living under the poverty level (Pet poor) and other 
expenditure need-generating features, such as the percent of the population of 
school age, the percent of the population that is elderly, and population 
density. Disparities in both fiscal capacity and expenditure needs highlight 
the important role equalization transfers need to play in Indonesia. 
Table 8.4 District/municipality disparities in revenues and fiscal capacity (in thousands of rupiahs) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient 
of variation Maximum Minimum 
GRDP 1999 per capita 4 901.20 10 372.08 2.12 147 676.76 856.50 
Total collection 1999 per capita 22.42 50.31 2.24 855.25 0.30 
Revenue share 2001 per capita 157.12 457.23 2.91 4 853.57 6.41 
DAU 2001 per capita 445.19 365.02 0.82 3 376.53 89.68 
After DAU 2001 per capita 467.61 369.80 0.79 3 395.64 105.33 
After all transfer 2001 per capita 624.73 721.56 1.15 6 984.57 137.76 
Regional revenue 2001 per capita 637.39 719.41 1.13 6 984.57 142.46 
DAU 2001 (% of expenditure) 96.95 23.97 0.25 203.67 42.74 
DAU 2002 per capita 522.55 393.35 0.75 3 376.53 110.76 
After DAU 2002 per capita 544.96 398.66 0.73 3 395.64 128.81 
After all transfer 2002 per capita 702.08 727.77 1.04 7 041.28 160.19 
Regional revenue 2002 per capita 710.83 729.76 1.03 7 048.95 162.53 
Expenditures 2001 per capita 453.97 309.72 0.68 2 934.81 100.70 
Source: Authors' computations. See Appendix 8.2 for a full definition of all variables. 
Table 8.5 Province disparities in revenues and fiscal capacity (in thousands of rupiahs) 
Standard Coefficient 
Variable Mean deviation of variation Maximum Minimum 
GRDP 1999 per capita 4 977.53 4 614.32 0.93 23 465.08 1 429.58 
Total collection 1999 per capita 23.73 38.56 1.62 201.90 5.22 
Revenue share 2001 per capita 42.14 93.79 2.23 412.51 3.14 
DAU 2001 per capita 50.03 30.80 0.62 151.47 13.02 
After DAU 2001 per capita 70.60 50.32 0.71 271.93 17.65 
After all transfer 2001 per capita 112.74 132.72 1.18 572.30 25.88 
Regional revenue 2001 per capita 125.96 132.75 1.05 594.46 26.08 
DAU 2001 (% of expenditure) 62.66 87.43 1.40 414.19 18.26 
DAU 2002 per capita 72.31 50.88 0.70 185.21 11.10 
After DAU 2002 per capita 92.88 59.10 0.64 265.83 19.37 
After all transfer 2002 per capita 135.02 121.40 0.90 566.20 27.60 
Regional revenue 2002 per capita 140.46 131.80 0.94 594.50 27.60 
Expenditures 2001 per capita 130.50 84.11 0.64 301.87 4.26 
Source: See Appendix 8.2 for a full definition of all variables. 
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Table 8.6 District/municipality disparities in expenditure needs 
Standard Coefficient 
Variable Mean deviation of variation Maximum Minimum 
Pet poor (%) 24.53 15.25 0.62 91.12 0.99 
Pet labour (%) 39.85 7.37 0.18 77.05 13.25 
Pet school age (%) 15.80 4.81 0.30 41.31 4.18 
Pet old (%) 3.45 1.98 0.58 10.14 0.05 
Pet young (%) 28.55 6.64 0.23 44.46 12.10 
Area (km) 5 763.13 10 712.69 1.86 119 749.00 16.46 
Density (per km) 976.75 1 894.20 1.94 12 744.48 0.86 
Const index 135.27 18.51 0.14 258.90 113.20 
Source: Authors' computations. See Appendix 8.2 for a full definition of all variables. 
Table 8.7 Province disparities in expenditure needs 
Standard Coefficient 
Variable Mean deviation of variation Maximum Minimum 
Pet poor (%) 24.58 12.64 0.51 55.81 4.53 
Pet labour (%) 41.58 12.12 0.29 88.11 23.35 
Pet school age (%) 17.58 6.51 0.37 44.71 9.12 
Pet old (%) 3.18 1.54 0.49 7.96 0.88 
Pet young (%) 30.68 10.59 0.35 73.14 16.34 
Area (km) 64 569.1 81 718.08 1.27 414 039.95 661.62 
Density (per km) 648.71 2 294.68 3.54 12 673.22 5.28 
Const index 134.82 14.77 0.11 203.44 116.34 
Source: Authors' computations. See Appendix 8.2 for a full definition of all variables. 
To Address Externalities and Interjurisdictional Spillovers, Central 
Government Policy Objectives, and the Implementation of National 
Programs at Local Level 
Indonesia currently has no conditional transfers. Most countries use some 
form of conditional transfers in support of sub-national governments for 
expenditure areas such as roads, water and sewerage treatment plants, trans­
portation, housing, education, health, and so on. However, there is considerable 
variety across countries in the objectives pursued and the actual structural 
design of capital transfers. An important sub-category of conditional grants is 
that of capital transfers. The typical country has a variety of capital transfers 
that are closed-funded in the national budget, provide earmarked funds within 
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specific capital expenditures and, as is the case for the DAK in Indonesia, 
require some level of matching funds from sub-national governments.18 The 
funds are commonly allocated either by an objective formula or on a specific 
project basis. 
Conditional transfers and capital transfers may be used for many different 
objectives. Common objectives for conditional transfers include: 
• addressing externalities at sub-national level because of spillover ef­
fects of some services or infrastructure across sub-national jurisdictions; 
• addressing vertical imbalances in the assignment of revenues in favor 
of central authorities; 
• addressing limitations with borrowing at sub-national level either be­
cause of borrowing limits and other restrictions or because of lack of 
credit availability; 
• rewarding sub-national expenditure in areas of particular national im­
portance or in support of national programs actually implemented at 
regional and local levels. 
In the case of Indonesia, expenditure responsibilities for health and educa­
tion for example are at sub-national level as mandated in Law No. 22/1999. If 
these services produce positive externalities, it is likely that local govern­
ments may currently be under-spending on them. Since the DAU is not 
intended to accommodate specific central government objectives, the govern­
ment will have to rely on the DAK. However, some parts of central government 
still feel strongly that it is not appropriate to promote the DAK mechanism in 
pursuing national objectives. Instead, they favor a deconcentration mecha­
nism in the form of Daftar Isian Proyek (DIP), or Development Project List. 
The total deconcentrated fund is not very far behind the total funds allocated 
to intergovernmental transfers. The persistence of the DIP is seen by many 
observers as an indication that central agencies still want to show their power 
in the regions. 
Note that the use of central government funds earmarked exclusively for 
capital investment at sub-national level means that central authorities have 
identified a need to enhance capital expenditures at sub-national level, as 
opposed to recurrent or ordinary expenditures. This need may arise from the 
existence of externalities across sub-national jurisdictions or from financing 
constraints sub-national governments face vis-k-vis lumpy capital expendi­
tures.19 Often, central authorities have a bias toward earmarking a large share 
of central government transfers for capital expenditures at sub-national level. 
This reflects an ingrained belief that capital expenditures are always more 
efficient than recurrent expenditures. Of course, there are no sound bases for 
this extreme position. The production of public services requires different 
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recurrent and capital input mixes, and the optimal mix should basically 
reflect the prices of different inputs and the physical requirements of avail­
able technologies.20 From an equity viewpoint, capital transfers may be used 
to redress inequities in the distribution of capital infrastructure that arose in 
the past.21 
HOW HAS INDONESIA'S NEW TRANSFER SYSTEM 
PERFORMED TO DATE? 
Has Budget Autonomy Been Preserved? 
One of the basic principles in the Indonesian decentralization process has 
been to give greater autonomy to local governments in managing their own 
budgets. Although it is true that the vast majority of revenue sources for sub-
national governments are under the control of central authorities, local 
governments seem to have a significant degree_of discretion to spend the 
funds according to their budget priorities, once the money is in their hands.22 
Ironically, local governments have been slow in moving away from past 
practices. Many local governments during 2001 appeared to have thought 
that the DAU was intended to pay all local civil servant salaries as the SDO 
did in the past. This misconception of course has been reinforced in 2002 by 
the computation of the 'balancing factor' on the basis of the past wage bill. 
Has Revenue Adequacy for Provinces and Districts/Municipalities Been 
Maintained? 
The new system of transfers has gone a long way toward ensuring 'revenue 
adequacy' during the past two years. As we have seen, the most significant 
component of the DAU allocations in 2001 and 2002 was the 'hold harmless' 
provision. These funds were supposed to allow local governments to pay all 
of their local civil servants, including the ones transferred from the central 
government offices in 2001. In addition, central government budgeted for a 
'contingency fund' in 2001 and again in 2002 to allow for additional finance 
needed by local governments with a mismatch between transferred personnel 
and available fiscal resources.23 
The claims for additional resources by local governments during 2001 had 
several sources. First, the transfer of central government employees was not 
entirely smooth, and many provincial governments ended up with more trans­
ferred employees than expected. Second, there was a (convenient) misconception 
among local governments that only DAU funds could be used to pay local civil 
servants. Even though some local governments had additional sources of 
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revenues such as from revenue sharing, they refused to use those additional 
funds to pay their employees' salaries. Third, in the middle of 2001, central 
government suddenly mandated an increase in civil servant salaries, retroactive 
to January 1. This policy affected all civil servant salaries without any exception, 
and imposed an additional obligation on local governments. Because the DAU 
2001 had been formulated using pre-2001 salary data, it was not surprising that 
some local governments had to ask for additional funds. 
It has been argued there is still another reason why local revenues might 
not be adequate. This is related to how the DAU itself is formulated, espe­
cially on the expenditure need side. Due to the unavailability of minimum 
standards of public service, expenditure needs are approximated, not calcu­
lated. This means that the estimation of expenditure needs might not reflect 
the real needs of local governments. However, this argument again assumes 
that it is politically feasible and fiscally affordable to develop an exhaustive 
list of budgetary standards at local level. International experience shows that 
these are difficult tasks to perform. 
Have Transfers Been Stable? 
Stability of transfers is a desirable characteristic because it facilitates local 
government budgeting and planning. While flows from the DAU have been 
remarkably stable, the story is very different for revenue sharing transfers. 
The stability of the DAU has been based on the permanency of the funding 
rule (at least 25 percent of net domestic revenue), and also on the fact that 
central government allocated the funds anticipated in the budget as opposed 
to the funds actually collected by the tax authorities. This arrangement has 
allowed central government to transfer the DAU funds on time every month. 
In contrast, for revenue sharing the transfer of funds has not been stable 
and has not been on time either. Central government originally promised to 
implement the actual transfer quarterly; instead, the first transfer received by 
local governments occurred after six months in 2001. A similar pattern was 
repeated in 2002, both for natural resources revenue sharing and for other tax 
revenue sharing, due in part to the difficulty of gathering full information on 
actual revenue collections in the regions. With these revenues there can be no 
guarantee that the amount of sharing will be stable or similar from year to 
year, but the central authorities need to make an effort to improve the fre­
quency of the payments. 
Is the Current System of Transfers Transparent and Simple? 
The current intergovernmental system still cannot be considered reasonably 
transparent and simple. For the DAU as the major part of the transfer, 
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transparency has increased through different efforts such as book publica­
tion, dissemination ('socialization'), and, most importantly, the use of a 
standard formula to allocate the funds. However, the 2002 DAU was still 
not 'simple' enough because of the pressure exercised by natural resource-
rich regions and the 'hold harmless' provision insisted upon by Parliament. 
The original formula might have been simple but the final formula became 
quite complicated and relatively difficult to be described even by special­
ists. The issue of transparency in revenue sharing is complicated by the fact 
that the supporting data needed to calculate the allocations are not the type 
of data that are widely available; in fact, some government agencies and 
ministries still keep the data secret. Local governments naturally have had 
some difficulties whenever they have tried to reconfirm the calculations. 
The calculation method itself is far from simple and relatively difficult to 
understand, especially for natural resource revenue sharing. As a result, 
except for personal income tax revenue sharing, it is difficult for local 
governments to predict their possible revenue from the revenue sharing 
scheme. 
Have Transfers Distorted Expenditure Decisions and Discouraged Sub-
national Tax Efforts? 
The structure of the DAU formula takes special care not to introduce any 
distortion in the expenditure decisions of local governments. All the variables 
used in the estimation of expenditure needs are objectively defined and be­
yond manipulation by changes in local government behavior. The big 
exception, however, is the definition and computation of the 'hold harmless' 
provision for 2002, which, as we have seen, is defined in terms of the local 
government's wage bill for the previous year. This, of course, gives a signifi­
cant incentive to local governments to increase their personnel expenditures 
at the cost of other expenditure priorities. 
Law No. 25/1999 implicitly introduces a hard-budget constraint for local 
governments by designing DAU as a formula-based transfer and revenue 
sharing as an actual revenue-based transfer. In the new set up, there should be 
no room for local governments to be 'subsidized' by central government if 
they have problems with their budgets. The Law clearly states that, if a local 
government needs additional revenue, then it can borrow directly from finan­
cial institutions or by issuing municipal bonds. However, in 2001, the hard 
budget constraint was partially violated by the introduction of the contin­
gency fund. As mentioned earlier, there were some good reasons why the 
contingency fund had to be used. A related fact was that because of macro-
economic concerns central government, through presidential decree, prohibited 
all types of local borrowing. 
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What has been the effect of the new transfers on local tax efforts? Because 
the DAU formula uses estimates of fiscal capacity rather than actual revenues 
collected, the introduction of the new transfers should not have affected local 
government 'tax efforts,' defined as the ratio of own tax and fees revenues 
divided by regional gross domestic product. However, there was the possibility 
of an 'income effect' whereby the new transfers may have affected tax efforts. 
To test for the neutrality of the new transfer system on tax efforts, we ran a 
number of regressions of tax efforts at the provincial and district/municipality 
levels for 2001 and 2002 on the level of DAU transfers (as a percent of total 
expenditures), and several other control variables including gross regional product 
per capita. The results are shown in Tables 8.8 and 8.9, where we report only 
the results for 2002; the results for 2001 were very similar. 
For provinces (Table 8.8), we find that the higher the DAU contribution in 
provincial government expenditures, the lower local tax effort. This is a 
surprising result because provincial governments were a bit shortchanged by 
the DAU system in 2001, and therefore they should have made an extra effort 
to collect more of their own revenues. Perhaps provincial governments were 
attempting to signal to central government there was a need for contingency 
funds. Also of note are the positive and significant relationships of population 
density and income tax revenue sharing to tax effort. Higher population 
density could indicate active economic activities that lead to higher potential 
tax revenue, while higher income tax sharing indicates higher economic 
capacity that should generate higher local tax revenue. For the case of dis­
tricts/municipalities (Table 8.9), we find that the DAU is, as expected, an 
insignificant factor in local tax effort. Among the other control variables, 
income tax revenue sharing and population density contribute positively to 
tax effort. 
Have Transfers Been Equalizing? 
It appears that DAU transfers have in general been equalizing (e.g. they have 
helped dampen fiscal disparities), but not by very much, since fiscal dispari­
ties (measured in local revenues per capita) after the DAU remain high. The 
sharing of natural resource revenues, on the other hand, has been highly 
unequalizing, which was as expected given the uneven distribution of natural 
resource endowments across local governments. Other tax sharing has also 
contributed to fiscal disparities. 
The desired extent of equalization is still an open policy question in Indone­
sia since there has never been a 'white paper' or master plan of decentralization 
reform with explicitly stated objectives. The DAU itself has lacked formalized 
performance criteria. This no doubt has complicated the evaluation of the 
system and its reform in 2002 and later years. 
Table 8.8 Explaining provincial tax efforts in 2002 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(8) 
Intercept 
GRDP 1999 per capita 
DAU 2002 (pet of 
expenditure) 
Const index 
Density 
Income tax (pet of 
total revenue) 
R2 
0.35635** 
0.00000566 
0.0006708* 
0.8565* 
0.00000916 
0.0006735* 
-0.003837 
0.39940** 
-0.00001280 
-0.0006429** 
0.00007117* 
0.205 0.255 0.532 
0.7072 
-0.00000994 
-0.0006456 
-0.002374 
0.00006851 
0.551 
0.34046** 
-0.0000092 
-0.0007340** 
0.7258* 
-0.00000591 
-0.0007335** 
-0.002951 
0.024280** 0.023259** 
0.425 0.454 
0.341139** 
-0.00001236 
-0.0006215** 
0.00008423* 
0.00624 
0.536 
0.7131* 
-0.00000959 
-0.0006262** 
0.00566 
-0.002335 
0.00008039* 
0.554 
Notes'. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is provincial tax effort. 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
Table 8.9 Explaining local tax efforts in 2002 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.5882** 0.1720 0.5310* 0.0008 0.4517* 0.0579 0.4469* -0.0147 
GRDP 1999 per capita - - - -0.00000615 -0.00000811* -0.00000693* -0.00000838* -0.00000688 -0.00000853* 
DAU 2002 (pet of 0.00000593 0.0000074* 0.000211 -0.000723 0.000640 -0.000122 0.000631 -0.000261 
expenditure) 
Const index 0.000017 -0.000768 0.004715 0.003614 0.05757 
Density 0.003792 0.00003718 0.00004532* 0.00001687 0.004209* 
Income tax (pet of 0.07912* 0.07743* 0.06686* 0.00002696 
total revenue) 
R2 0.060 0.130 0.140 0.240 0.210 0.270 0.220 0.300 
Notes: 
The dependent variable in all regressions is district/municipality tax effort. 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Another important complicating factor in the equalization performance of 
the DAU has been the introduction of the balancing factor or 'hold harmless' 
provision in the DAU. For example, using a public wage bill criterion to 
distribute the balancing factor funds in 2001 and 2002 contributed to fiscal 
disparities because of historical patterns of public employment.24 Basing the 
balancing factor on the previous SDO and INPRES meant that local govern­
ments that used to receive big transfers continued to receive them.25 
Some empirical evidence on the equalization impact of transfers in 2002 
is presented in Table 8.10 for provinces and Table 8.11 for districts/munici­
palities. These tables show the dispersion of revenues per capita (coefficient 
of variation and range between maximum and minimum values) for own 
revenues, the two main categories of shared revenues, and the DAU. The 
tables also show the dispersion for different cumulative arrangements of 
revenue sources. We also made these calculations for 2001, with very 
similar results. 
In the case of the provinces, general revenue sharing and sharing of natural 
resources show more dispersion than own revenues, but the cumulative distri­
bution of total revenues per capita after the DAU is added has a significantly 
lower dispersion. The coefficient of variation falls from 1.90 before the DAU 
to 0.90 after the DAU in 2002.26 Similar results hold for districts/municipali­
ties. The main contrasts are that the sharing in natural resource revenues 
appears to be much more unequalizing at local level and that the DAU 
distributions have a stronger equalizing effect. For example, in 2002 the 
coefficient of variation for revenues per capita before the DAU is 2.58, and 
drops to 1.04 after the DAU. 
These results provide general evidence that the DAU has equalizing effects 
at provincial and district/municipality levels. However, even after the DAU, 
the coefficients of variation remain high, always with a value over one. The 
very large differences between maximum and minimum values of revenues 
per capita dramatize the fact that DAU is still not effective in reducing fiscal 
disparities to acceptable levels. 
An additional way to examine the equalization performance of the DAU is 
to study whether it lives up to its promise of equalizing fiscal capacity and 
expenditure needs. With this objective in mind, we ran a series of regressions 
explaining DAU distributions at provincial level for 2001 and 2002 and at 
district/municipality level also for 2001 and 2002. Besides using the entire 
DAU allocation as the dependent variable, we also added two other depend­
ent variables by breaking up the DAU allocation into the 'balancing fund 
amount' and the 'formula amount.' For explanatory variables, we selected the 
variable 'gross regional product per capita' (GDRPCAP) as a measure of 
fiscal capacity, and we also used as a control variable 'tax effort.' For ex­
planatory variables on the expenditure need side, we selected some of the 
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variables used in the DAU formula, such as the construction price index and 
the percent living in poverty; we also selected other variables that are reflec­
tive of need and are not strictly included in the DAU formula, such as percent 
of the population of retirement age, percent of population younger than 
working age, and population density. We report only the results for 2002, in 
Table 8.12 for provinces and Table 8.13 for districts/municipalities. 
The regression results show that the DAU allocations generally do not 
equalize fiscal capacity. In fact, DAU allocations per capita tend to increase 
with gross regional product per capita, so that richer jurisdictions get higher 
allocations. This result tends to occur largely because of the impact of the 
'balancing fund'.27 On the expenditure need side, the regression results show 
that typically the DAU tends to increase with poverty and the construction 
price index, as expected from the role these variables play in the DAU 
formula. However, the effects of these variables in the DAU allocations per 
capita are often diluted, or not statistically significant. Importantly, we find 
that the 'balancing fund' component of the DAU not only increases with 
income, but that it also explicitly penalizes those jurisdictions with higher 
expenditure needs (holding income constant). This is manifested by the nega­
tive and statistically significant regression coefficients for the 'balancing 
Table 8.12 Regression analysis of the DAU for provinces, 2002 (per capita 
in thousands of Rp) 
Balancing DAU 
Independent DAU Regional fund per formula 
variable transfers expenditure capita per capita 
Intercept -8.6 -77.9 18.07 -26.68 
GRDP 1999 -0.001495 0.007186* 0.0009881 -0.002483 
per capita 
Const index 0.1888 0.613 -0.1415 0.3303 
Poor 1.6872* 2.882* 0.5761* 1.1111 
Older -5.841 -16.36 -1.925 -3.916 
Younger 1.437 0.832 0.3186 1.1185 
Density 0.004222 -0.008308 0.001386 0.002836 
Tax effort -21.03 159.54* 19.43 ^0.47 
R2 0.310 0.473 0.319 0.426 
Notes: 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** Indicates statistical significance at 
the 1 percent level. 
Older: Percentage of the populations older than working age; Poor: Percentage of the popula­
tion in poverty; Younger: Percentage of the population younger than working age. 
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Table 8.13 Regression analysis of the DAU for districts/municipalities, 
2002 (per capita in thousands ofRp) 
Balancing DAU 
Independent DAU Regional fund per formula 
variable transfers expenditure capita per capita 
Intercept -837.5** —477.2** 52.9 -890.4** 
GRDP 1999 0.003749* 0.004521** 0.005085** -0.001335 
per capita 
Const index 11.352** 7.5469** 3.4472** 7.9051** 
Poor -1.752 -2.130* -2.2181** 0.4656 
Older -1.30 -3.804 -6.277 4.981 
Younger -5.104* -1.523 -5.717** 0.614 
Density -0.016025 -0.018058* -0.012169* -0.003856 
Tax effort 26.47 26.06 6.9 19.48 
R2 0.326 0.275 0.210 0.387 
Notes: 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates statistical significance at 
the 1 percent level. 
Older: Percentage of the populations older than working age; Poor: Percentage of the popula­
tion in poverty; Younger: Percentage of the population younger than working age. 
factor' on poverty and the percent of population with higher public expendi­
ture needs, such as the young and the old. 
In summary, the regression results provide evidence that the implementa­
tion of the DAU has been pushing for conflicting objectives. The 'formula 
amount' pushes for equalization, but the 'balancing factor' undermines equali­
zation via its pursuit of addressing vertical imbalances. It is quite unlikely 
that this is something that the policymakers in the executive and the Parlia­
ment wanted, and it highlights the need to further reform Indonesia's system 
of transfers.28 
CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD 
Indonesia has made remarkable progress over the last two years in putting 
together an efficient and effective system of intergovernmental transfers. In 
this very short period Indonesia has achieved what has taken other countries a 
decade or longer to achieve. Progress has been most evident in the design, as 
opposed to the implementation, of the DAU system of equalization transfers. 
However, problems remain in a number of areas, including the DAU. 
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The most fundamental problem is that the GOI has relied on the DAU to 
pursue too many objectives. Although current legislation proclaims the es­
sence of the DAU as an equalization grant, in practice the GOI has used the 
DAU to pursue other objectives, the most significant of which are closing the 
vertical balance between the central and sub-national governments and re­
dressing perceived historical injustices in the allocation of revenues from 
natural resources. More recently, there have been noises in government cir­
cles about also using the DAU to ensure that certain national expenditure 
priorities are safeguarded under decentralization. 
So far, the outcome of pursuing these many policy objectives with one 
policy instrument, the DAU, has been muddled or confused performance. The 
equalization results the DAU achieves through its 'formula component' are to 
a large extent undone by the implementation of its 'balancing factor compo­
nent.' The GOI needs to develop within the system of transfers new tools to 
address important policy objectives other than equalization. 
The recent reforms introduced revenue sharing as an almost new instru­
ment of sub-national finance in Indonesia. However, revenue sharing plays a 
significant role for only a minority of sub-national governments, and those 
that benefit from revenue sharing seem to be powerless in predicting how 
much they are going to receive in funds during the fiscal year. The other 
instrument of sub-national finance introduced by the recent reforms, the 
conditional matching grants, has not been used at all. 
These considerations lead us to make several general recommendations, as 
well as some specific suggestions for the DAU and the DAK. 
Regarding general recommendations, we believe the future reform of the 
system of transfers should follow three fundamental thrusts. First, the GOI 
should expand revenue autonomy at sub-national level as the best way to 
address vertical imbalances. Politically, it will be hard to retrench from the 
current level of revenue sharing, especially in the case of natural resource 
revenues. However, little can be gained from expanding revenue sharing to 
address vertical imbalances. Providing provinces and districts/municipalities 
with more significant discretion over tax rates can achieve the same results 
with the added benefits of increased efficiency and accountability at sub-
national level. Central government needs to evaluate the applicability of the 
'piggybacking' system for personal income tax, but also of other taxes as a 
way to provide revenue autonomy at sub-national level. Property tax should 
be fully assigned at local level. 
Second, the DAU must be used exclusively in the pursuit of the equaliza­
tion objective. This will mean that addressing the issue of perceived historical 
injustices in the sharing of revenues from natural resources will have to be 
pursued though revenue sharing as is now the case, or even through special 
transfers. Similarly, the general funding or vertical imbalance issue, now 
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pursued with the 'balancing factor' within the DAU, needs to be addressed 
through more tax autonomy, more revenue sharing, or additional transfers. 
The DAU structure should be updated with the goal of improving on its 
equalization performance. The GOI will need to define explicitly its equaliza­
tion target and to determine whether zero or even negative allocations will be 
allowed. 
Third, there is widespread concern at central government level that local 
governments might not pay enough attention to national priorities such as 
basic education and primary health, poverty alleviation, or infrastructure 
provision. The GOI needs to develop a system of conditional grants under the 
legal umbrella of the DAK to pursue specific policy objectives regarding 
infrastructure or particular central government programs. Because of the 
importance of the health and education sectors in national priorities and the 
fact that these are now the responsibilities of local governments, the GOI 
could develop a system of per capita conditional grants that would ensure 
minimum expenditure standards at local level in these sectors. Funding for 
per capita conditional grants in health and education could come in part from 
the funds now spent on the balancing factor of the DAU. These conditional 
grants would provide help with a 'hold harmless' objective but would switch 
funding from budget inputs (e.g. public employees) to budget outputs (e.g. 
number of children educated and population at risk). The funding for condi­
tional grants for infrastructure and other areas could come in part from the 
still largely deconcentrated funds now controlled by the line ministries in 
Jakarta. 
It is important for the new set of reforms in the transfer system to be part of 
the comprehensive view of where the entire system of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations is going, and not just the system of transfers. But for these 
reforms to fit together well, it is still necessary for the GOI to produce an 
overall strategy, or 'white paper,' for reform. 
Central government also needs to examine the current administrative or­
ganization. In particular, should the reformed equalization transfers and the 
new conditional grants flow directly from central government to local gov­
ernments, or should they go through the provinces as the intermediate level of 
government? This decision should be congruent with the choice made on the 
overall approach to organizing intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
The GOI should further consider the need for formalizing the management 
of the system of DAU and DAK transfers. There is a need to collect better 
statistics and to improve the existing ones. For the calculation of the DAU in 
2002, for example, there are some variables still using 1999 data. Ideally, the 
data used for calculating the DAU should be for two years at most prior to the 
year of DAU (e.g. for DAU 2002, all data should be 2000 data). In addition, 
the reliability and consistency of data essential to the DAU are sometimes 
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doubtful, especially for population and area; the information on the construc­
tion price index is also of questionable reliability. There is also a need to 
update the equalization formula, introducing changes in the mechanism to 
keep within its objectives, and to maintain a dialog with sub-national govern­
ments and other stakeholders. Several government agencies currently are in 
charge of administering the DAU. One possibility is whether to imitate other 
countries such as Australia and India and to create a 'grants commission,' a 
semi-autonomous institution at central government level that is exclusively 
charged with the administration and upkeep of the transfer system. The 
advantage of a 'grants commission' is its greater impartiality and objectivity 
in administering the equalization grant system. 
As for more specific suggestions regarding the DAU, the current practice 
of distributing the DAU pool of funds as fixed in the budget is a desirable 
approach because regional governments have more certainty about planning 
and executing their budgets once the central budget is approved. The actual 
rule of 25 percent of net domestic revenues can and should be changed in the 
overhaul of the system of transfers, but it is desirable that the new percentage 
should stay stable for a period of several years. Overall funding for the DAU 
needs to be decided in the wider context of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
and national priorities. How much of the available national resources should 
be dedicated to equalizing sub-national fiscal disparities is a political deci­
sion that requires the direct involvement of Parliament and the government. 
However, in order to reach the right level of funding, the DAU funding rule 
needs to be openly discussed and the country priorities reflected in it. 
Equalization transfers in Indonesia are correctly conceived of as uncondi­
tional (or general funding) grants, with their final use left to the discretion of 
local governments. Pressure to impose conditionality on the use of those 
funds must be resisted. Conditional grants should be used for the pursuit of 
other objectives. 
There is a need to remove the negative incentives that remain in the form 
of using the wage bill as the basis of the distribution of finance for the 'hold 
harmless' funds. 
The introduction of explicit public service standards for the computation 
of expenditure needs may bring more problems than benefits. Clearly, ex­
penditure norms defined by the Ministry of Finance or any other agency 
cannot in the present economic circumstances be anywhere near the level that 
sub-national governments would consider adequate; otherwise there would 
be a very significant budget deficit at sub-national or central levels. Thus the 
use of explicit standards may contribute to the feelings of insensitivity and 
injustice toward sub-national governments. The current approach now used in 
the DAU of using an index to approximate needs is used in many other 
countries.29 
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There is a need for better data and improved measurements of fiscal capac­
ity at provincial and local levels. Natural resources revenue sharing has to be 
considered 100 percent revenue to local governments and not just 75 percent 
as is now the case. Central government must not accept local government 
demands to switch to actual or collected own revenues in the measurement of 
fiscal capacity, as agreeing to this will certainly create negative incentives for 
revenue mobilization by local governments. Instead, there is a need to de­
velop better estimation methods of potential local own revenue. 
Finally, we have several specific suggestions for the DAK. First, if condi­
tional grants for education and health are introduced, they should be computed 
on a per student and per inhabitant basis, respectively.30 This offers the 
advantages of the grants being inherently equalizing, of them providing local 
authorities with budgetary autonomy in terms of expenditure priorities (within 
education and health), and of the grants providing the most efficient method 
of service delivery.31 These grants may imply, among other things, changes in 
revenue sharing and quite likely a reduction in the pool of funds dedicated to 
equalization under the DAU. Second, as is the case for the DAU, the design 
of conditional transfers must take into account the potential strategic behavior 
of sub-national governments and the incentive signals provided to them in the 
structure of capital grants. A good dose of realism will also be necessary. It 
will typically be desirable that DAK grants satisfy the requirement of 
'additionality,' so that capital grants are not a substitute for capital expendi­
ture that sub-national governments would otherwise have undertaken. For 
this reason, DAK transfers should keep the co-financing (or matching) re­
quirements now in the law. Third, it will be more efficient and transparent to 
allocate conditional grant funds by using objective formulas. When a formula 
approach is not feasible, the allocation of funds and the selection process for 
the grants should still be made according to explicitly legislated criteria. 
NOTES 
The authors are very grateful to James Aim for comments and Rofiq for computational assist­
ance. 
1. Revenue sharing on a derivation basis means that central government shares revenues with 
the sub-national governments where the revenues have been collected or derived. 
2. See Silver, Azis, and Schroeder (2001) for an evaluation of the SDO and INPRES sys­
tems. 
3. Of course, the common accusation outside Jakarta has been that central government has 
practiced de facto asymmetric decentralization policies by benefiting Jakarta and more 
generally Java at the cost of the other provinces. This is a complex issue. Before 1999, 
there was no revenue sharing from natural resources, but rural provinces such as Papua 
seem to have been favored under the INPRES system. 
4. In addition, Papua gets a special grant equal to 2 percent of the DAU transfer. Another 
important asymmetric benefit for these two provinces is that the additional revenue sharing 
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provided in the special autonomy laws is not to be taken into account in the computation 
of fiscal capacity in the DAU formula. This benefit is on top of the general benefit that all 
natural resource producing provinces and local governments receive because the measure­
ment of fiscal capacity in the DAU formula in 2002 only recognizes 75 percent of shared 
revenues, when all other shared revenues are recognized at 100 percent. 
5. The current practice is to apportion PIT among jurisdictions by 'place of work' rather than 
'place of residence.' This can lead to unfair apportionment of revenues among jurisdic­
tions in large metropolitan areas where many individuals reside in one jurisdiction where 
they consume most of their public services, but have their place of work in different 
jurisdictions. 
6. In 2001 the lump sum was determined in a residual fashion, as the moneys left after the 
funds distributed through the formula and the balancing amount. The latter is defined 
later. 
7. The wage bill for each jurisdiction was computed as the money spent for that purpose in 
September 2001 times.12 months. 
8. This clearly could be the case if public employees per capita were not evenly distributed 
across the territory. Historically, better off regions had more services and public bureau­
crats. 
9. Recall that revenue sharing from natural resources is not fully taken into account in the 
derivation of fiscal capacity of local governments. 
10. Law No. 25/1999 seems to be referring here to the financing of physical capital invest­
ment. However, there is also the possibility of interpreting the DAK as a system of 
conditional grants for current and capital expenditures. 
11. This is a much broader term, which would seem to allow all sorts of conditional grants for 
defined sectoral objectives in health, education, and so on. 
12. This matching rule does not apply to reforestation funds. 
13. The reforestation fees are distributed 40 percent to the producing regions while the rest is 
kept by central government for reforestation activities all over the country, especially in 
non-producing regions. 
14. All four factors (population, land area, poverty, and geographical conditions as proxied by 
the construction price index) are mentioned in Law No. 25/1999. A general interpretation 
has been that the reference in Law No. 25/1999 does not mean that these variables need to 
be entered the way they were entered in 2001, or that other variables could not be entered. 
As for weights, the equal weights in 2001 were widely believed to be off the mark. For 
example, population seemed to be significantly under-weighted vis-it-vis the other vari­
ables. To arrive at the right weights, it is necessary to remember that the expenditure needs 
index serves as a substitute for a bottom-up approach that would estimate expenditure 
needs on the basis of the costs of delivering a standard basket of public services across 
local governments. This bottom-up approach would be more likely to reflect disparities in 
expenditure needs than a simple index. However, the bottom-up approach is more com­
plex and is fraught with political complications. 
15. Another possibility would be to introduce negative transfers or compulsory extractions 
from these local governments as payments to the pool of funds to be distributed through 
the equalization mechanism. This is essentially the approach adopted by countries that 
have horizontally funded (also known as 'fraternal') equalization grant systems. This 
approach would appear to deviate significantly from the spirit of the current DAU system. 
16. The measure may be institutionally biased against sub-national governments since typi­
cally those governments are not as free as the central government to run budget deficits 
and to borrow to finance their expenditures. 
17. The question of revenue adequacy at different levels of government must be answered 
politically. For any assignment of expenditure responsibilities among different levels of 
government, the revenue sources and other funding provided to sub-national governments 
is a question of establishing clear national priorities. How much of the national resources 
does the country wish to spend on education, health, and other sub-national expenditure 
responsibilities vis-i-vis other important services, such as national defense, assigned at 
the central level? These decisions about spending priorities are likely to change over time. 
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and they are most conveniently made within the context of a medium-term expenditure 
framework. Revenue adequacy and vertical balance should logically be interpreted within 
the context of the overall constraint on public sector resources. It is always helpful to have 
a national dialog on what constitutes 'adequate resources,' with participation of all 
stakeholders. Although perfect consensus is unlikely to be reached, the dialog can protect 
sub-national governments from central government using decentralization as a way to 
solve its own fiscal shortcomings, and can also be a way to facilitate the role of the central 
authorities by making sub-national governments more aware of existing fiscal constraints. 
18. Matching arrangements help to obtain 'additionality' or 'maintenance-of-effort' in sub-
national expenditures, and tend to increase ownership of projects at local level. 
19. However, often the fundamental question remains of why central authorities would have 
better information than sub-national governments regarding the right input mix in the 
production of sub-national public services. 
20. Clearly, there will not be good education services, for example, if there are no funds for 
books and basic supplies, regardless of the quality and newness of school buildings. 
21. Unfortunately, this is fraught with difficulties in measuring the quantity and quality and 
because of the need to avoid rewarding sub-national governments that have made clearly 
voluntary decisions to spend less on capital infrastructure and more on other types of 
expenditures. Capital grants should not be a substitute for prudent borrowing policies by 
sub-national governments. 
22. The most important limitations on local budget autonomy are inabilities to reduce person­
nel and to set wages. 
23. The 2001 contingency fund was budgeted at Rp 6.2 trillion of which Rp 2.8 trillion was 
disbursed. In 2002 central government used the budgeted contingency fund of Rp 2.1 
trillion to fund part of the 'hold harmless' funds mandated by Parliament. 
24. See Hofman et al. (2002). 
25. Despite the inertia introduced in the system by the balancing factor, it is interesting to 
note that the new DAU system is more equalizing than the old SDO and INPRES system. 
See Lewis (2001). 
26. For 2001, the coefficient of variation falls from 1.90 before the DAU to 1.18 after the 
DAU. 
27. It is interesting that the 'DAU formula amount' for 2001 was positively and statistically 
significant related to gross regional product per capita at district/municipality level, but 
that this relationship did not hold for 2002. 
28. Our regression results are generally consistent with those obtained by Lewis (2001) and 
Hofman et al. (2002). 
29. See Aim and Martinez-Vazquez (2002) for a discussion of expenditure norms. 
30. The per capita basis could be modified, if needed, by some adjustment coefficient to 
reflect different costs of provision or needs. 
31. It must be made clear that the conditional grants should not be made for economic 
categories of expenditure, such as wages and salaries. This would eliminate any of the 
advantages of a decentralized delivery and implementation system and the full centraliza­
tion of those services would produce the same results. Naturally, for local governments to 
be able to increase efficiency in the delivery of services, it would also be necessary to 
reduce, if not eliminate, central government norms and mandates that interfere with their 
choices. 
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APPENDIX 8.1 THE 2002 AND 2001 DAU FORMULAE 
A. 2002 General Allocation Fund (DAU) Formula 
I. Fiscal Gap = Fiscal (Expenditure) Needs - Fiscal Capacity 
II. Fiscal Capacity = LORadj + (PT + LTF + PIT + 0.75*NRS) 
LORadj: Local Own Revenue Adjustment (or Predicted) = a + b*GRDP 
Services 
PT: Property Tax Revenue Sharing 
LTF: Land Transfer Fee Revenue Sharing 
PIT: Personal Income Tax Revenue Sharing 
NRS: Natural Resources Revenue Sharing 
III. Fiscal Needs = ALE (0.4 PI + 0.1 AI + 0.1 RPI + 0.4 CI) 
ALE: Average Local Expenditure 
PI: Population Index 
AI: Area Index 
RPI: Relative Poverty Index 
CI: Construction Index 
V.DAU, = AM + (LDW * DAUn) 
Local DAU Weight (LDW) = Local Fiscal Gap/National Fiscal Gap 
DAUj: DAU for each province or district/municipality 
DAUn: DAU total, for all province or district/municipality 
AM: Minimum Allocation = LS + (a*CSS) 
LS: Lump sum equal for each province or district/municipality 
a*CSS: Proportion of Civil Servant Salary in 2001 
B. 2001 General Allocation Fund (DAU) Formula 
I. Fiscal Needs 
Fiscal Needs = Average Local Expenditures * l/4(Population Index + Area 
Index + Construction Price Index + Poverty Index) 
An analysis of Indonesia's transfer system 195 
Fiscal Needs Variables: 
a. Average Local Expenditures 
Average Local Expenditures = (Total Local Expenditures + Deconcentrated 
Funds)/Number of Local Governments 
b. Population Index 
Population Index = Local Population/Average Local Population 
c. Area Index 
Area Index = Local Area/Average Local Area 
d. Construction Price Index 
Construction Price Index = Local Construction Price Index/100 
e. Poverty Index 
Poverty Index = Number of Local Poor People/Average Local Poor People 
II. Fiscal Capacity 
Fiscal Capacity = Average Local Revenue * l/3(Industrial Index + Natural 
Resources Index + Human Resources Index) 
Fiscal Capacity Variables: 
a. Average Local Revenue 
Average Local Revenue = (Local Own Revenue + Tax Revenue Sharing)/ 
Number of Local Governments 
b. Natural Resources Index 
Natural Resources Index = (GRDP of Natural Resources/GRDP)/ 
(GDP of Natural Resources/GDP) 
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c. Industrial Index 
Industrial Index = (GRDP of Non Primary Sectors/GRDP)/(GDP of Non 
Primary Sectors/GDP) 
d. Human Resources Index 
Human Resources Index = (Local Labor Force/Local Population)/(National 
Labor Force/National Population) 
III. General Allocation Fund (GAF) 
GAF of a Local Government = Fiscal (Expenditure) Needs - Fiscal Capacity 
Local GAF Weight = GAF of a Local Government/GAF of All Local 
Governments 
GAF Distributed for a District/Muncipality = 0.9 * 0.25 * Total Domestic 
Revenue in National Budget * Local GAF Weight 
GAF Distributed for a Province = 0.1 * 0.25 * Total Domestic Revenue in 
National Budget * Local GAF Weight 
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APPENDIX 8.2 TABLE OF VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
AND UNITS OF MEASUREMENT 
Variable Definition Units of measurement 
POP 
POOR 
POVGAP 
LABOR 
SCHOOL AGE 
OLDER 
YOUNGER 
PCTPOOR 
PCTLABOR 
PCT SCHOOL AGE 
PCT OLD 
PCTYOUNG 
AREA (KM) 
DENSITY (PER KM) 
CONST INDEX 
GRDP 1999 PER CAP 
TAX EFFORT (1999) 
TOTAL COLLECTION 
1999 PER CAPITA 
REVENUE SHARE PER 
CAPITA (2001) 
Number of people 
Number of people in poverty 
Poverty gap 
Number of people in working 
age (age 15-59) 
Number of people in school 
Number of people older than 
working age (>59) 
Number of people younger 
than working age (<15) 
Percentage poor people of 
population 
Percentage working people of 
population 
Percentage school age people 
of population 
Percentage older people of 
population 
Percentage younger people of 
population 
Land area of local authority 
Population/Area 
Construction price index 
GRDP/Population 
(Local Tax+User Charges)/ 
Population 
Local Own Revenue/ 
Population 
(Tax Sharing+Natural Share)/ 
Population 
Thousands of people 
Thousands of people 
Thousands of people 
Thousands of people 
Thousands people 
Thousands people 
Thousands people 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
km2 
People/km2 
Thousands of rupiahs 
Thousands of rupiahs 
Thousands of rupiahs 
Thousands of rupiahs 
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Variable Definition Units of measurement 
DAU 2001 PER CAPITA DAU 2001/Population Thousands of rupiahs 
AFTER DAU 2001 PER 
CAPITA 
(Local Own+DAU 2001)/ 
Population 
Thousands of rupiahs 
AFTER ALL TRANSFER 
2001 PER CAPITA 
(Local Own+DAU 2001 + 
Revenue Share//Population 
Thousands of rupiahs 
REGIONAL REVENUE 
2001 PER CAPITA 
(Local Own+DAU 2001 + 
Revenue Share+Contingency 
Fund)/Population 
Thousands of rupiahs 
DAU 2001 (PCT OF 
EXPENDITURE) 
DAU 2001/Expenditure Percent 
DAU 2002 PER CAPITA DAU 2002/Population Thousands of rupiahs 
AFTER DAU 2002 PER 
CAPITA 
(Local Own+DAU 2002)/ 
Population 
Thousands of rupiahs 
AFTER ALL TRANSFER 
2002 PER CAPITA 
(Local Own+DAU 2002 + 
Revenue Share)/Population 
Thousands of rupiahs 
REGIONAL REVENUE 
2002 PER CAPITA 
(Local Own+DAU 2002 + 
Revenue Share+Contingency 
Fund)/Population 
Thousands of rupiahs 
DAU 2002 (PCT OF 
EXPENDITURE) 
DAU 2002/Expenditure Percent 
EXPENDITURES 2001 
PER CAPITA 
Expenditure FY 1999 (with 
adjustment)/Population 
Thousands of rupiahs 
TRANSFERS Dau 2001 or DAU 2002 Billions of rupiahs 
REVENUE SHARES (Tax Sharing + Natural Share) Billions of rupiahs 
TOTAL COLLECTION Local Own Revenue Billions of rupiahs 
REGIONAL REVENUE (Local Own+DAU + Revenue 
Share+Contingency Fund/ 
Balancing Fund) 
Billions of rupiahs 
AFTER TRANFERS Local Own Revenue + DAU Billions of rupiahs 
AFTER ALL TRANSFERS Local Own Revenue + DAU 
+ Revenue Share 
Billions of rupiahs 
REGIONAL 
EXPENDITURE 
Routine Expenditure + 
Development Expenditure 
Billions of rupiahs 
